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GEC/Marconi’s transformation from a diversified conglomerate to a focused telecommunications and 
information technology company was an eventful and rambling transmission that resulted in the deterioration of 
shareholders’ value. It represents one of the most dramatic falls from grace in British corporate history and one 
of the greatest corporate governance fiascos of all time. The study investigates the wealth effects of Marconi’s 
sell-offs and acquisitions on its shareholders’ value by calculating the abnormal returns on the announcement 
days of all the disposals/acquisition during 1996-2002. The results support the view that shareholders’ value 
increases when a company proceeds to corporate sell-offs to pursue a focus strategy. However, the authors 
conjecture that GEC/Marconi has destroyed shareholders’ value through these disposals/acquisitions because 
of several mistakes, such as being prone to heavy debt. 
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Diversification in the 1950’s and 1960’s gave rise to 
huge conglomerate firms and this has led Jiraporn, Kim, 
Davidson & Singh (2006) to question whether corporate 
diversification enhances or destroys shareholders’ 
value. Proponents of diversification argue that diversified 
firms gain benefits such as enhanced operating 
efficiency, larger internal capital markets from where 
companies could increase their debt capacity, lower 
taxes and the capability of taking up more positive net 
present value projects. On the other hand, critics of 
diversification argue for divestiture and re-focusing 
instead. 
 
For example, Jones and Miskell (2007) indicate that 
many mergers and acquisitions had unsatisfactory 
outcomes and that financial economists concluded that, 
on average, acquisitions benefited the shareholders of 
acquired firms rather than acquiring firms. A study by 
Berger and Ofek (1995) showed that diversification 
destroys value. They estimated the value of diversified 
firms’ segments as if they were conducting business as 
separate firms and found that the loss incurred varied 
from 13% to 15%. 
 
Furthermore, Hoskisson, Johnson, Tihanyi and White 
(2005) argue that corporate restructuring has been a 
very popular strategy during the past 25 years and its 
impact is felt in almost every sector of the U.S. and 
European economies. They distinguish between three 
forms of corporate restructuring: asset restructuring, 
financial restructuring and organizational restructuring. 
Asset restructuring involves the sale or spin-off of 
businesses within the corporate portfolio, leading to a 
refocused (predominantly lower) level of diversification. 
Financial restructuring encompasses leveraged buyouts, 
stock repurchases, and leveraged recapitalisations, 
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whereas organizational restructuring entails 
reorganisations within the firm that do not involve the 
sale or disposal of assets. The focus of this study is on 
corporate restructuring that leads to divestiture. 
 
To divest, conglomerate firms proceed to sell-offs, which 
are defined by Alexander, Benson and Kampmeyer 
(1984), as the action of selling some assets of a parent 
firm, like a division or a product line, to another firm. 
Reasons for divestitures (Weston, 1992), could be for 
abandoning the core business, changing strategies or 
restructuring, discarding unwanted business from prior 
acquisitions, financing prior acquisitions, warding off 
takeovers, reversing mistakes and/or lack of fit of the 
acquired division. 
 
Most studies show that it is worthwhile to divest. 
However, to reinvest the proceeds from asset sales, on 
the other hand, is thought to destroy value. Kaiser and 
Stouraitis (2001) tested this argument in the case of 
Thorn EMI, and could not support it. The aim of this 
paper is to investigate the effect of a restructuring 
programme on the shareholders’ value of Marconi 
Corporation plc, a provider of hardware and software for 
the communication and information industries. 
 
Marconi’s conversion from a UK corporate diversified 
conglomerate to an over-indebted company, is 
considered as one of the most dramatic falls from grace 
in British corporate history and one of the greatest 
corporate governance fiascos of all time. Marconi is a 
major global communications and information 
technology company with research and development 
facilities in 19 countries, manufacturing operations in 16 
countries and serving customers in over 100 countries 
including the United Kingdom, Continental Europe, 
North America, Africa, Asia and Australia. However, 
Marconi is also known for having the longest-suffering 
shareholders, since its shares, valued at £12.50 in 2000, 
have now collapsed after a massive slump in profits1. In 
the analysis to follow, the years from 1968 to 1996 are 
referred to as the Weinstock era (after GEC managing 
director’s name during that period), the years from 1996 
to 2001 as the Simpson era, (after new Marconi 
managing director’s name). From 1996 to 1999 Marconi 
was operating under the name of the General Electric 
Company and it was only in November 1999 that it 
started operating as Marconi. 
 
When GEC decided to rename itself Marconi (after one 
of its Italian subsidiaries), everyone knew that there 
were further significant changes to follow. GEC Plessey 
Telecommunications, which was one of GEC’s 
subsidiaries, was chosen to lead in the new era for GEC 
whose core division was now Marconi communications. 
Marconi communications was a product of GPT and a 
few telecom companies around the world. These 
                                                     
1 In May 2002 the company announced the biggest loss in British corporate history (£5.7bn). 
Although Marconi returned to profit with positive cash flows in September 2004, the failure to 
win a large contract with BT resulted in a 40% drop in share price and 800 redundancies. In 
August/September 2005, Marconi reviewed its strategic position and began discussions with 
possible buyers. 
changes not only changed GEC’s identity from a UK-
based diversified company to a more focused US-based 
company, but they also altered its structure and were 
generated by changes in operational and strategic 
levels2.  
 
During the 1960’s the company fitted the model of the 
financial control company that created stand-alone 
companies and did not intervene directly in their 
strategies; rather monitored results through financial 
targets. GEC was a highly risk-averse company with a 
modest growth performance. To compensate for the 
latter, diversified companies like GEC engaged in a 
series of acquisitions. However, in the 1990’s 
diversification ceased to be popular and instead the new 
trend was divestiture and focus. GEC’s financial control 
style was no longer effective and GEC was perceived by 
many as being an under-performing defence and 
engineering group (Seal, 2001). It was time for GEC to 
follow the new trend. By 1996, GPT was a solid 
business but being part of a directionless conglomerate 
like GEC affected its potential. The appointment of a 
new management, whose goal was to make GEC first or 
second in the world, led to a number of disposals and 
new acquisitions.  The original approach was to look for 
growth in three or four core business groups (defence, 
telecom and industrial groups), but the result was 
concentrating on one main industry (telecommun-
ications). 
 
In order to investigate the effect of the new strategic 
focus imposed on Marconi by Lord Simpson from 1996 
to 2002, details of all the disposal/acquisition 
announcement dates were collected and the abnormal 
returns around these dates were calculated.  Positive 
abnormal returns, (on average), were found on the 
announcement dates. This result is consistent with the 
theory and supports the fact that divesting, (increasing 
focus), enhances shareholders’ value. However, the 
result is not consistent with the theory that managers 
destroy shareholders’ value when they reinvest the 
proceeds from asset sales for expansion through 
acquisition. 
 
The remainder of the paper is organised as follows: The 
following section presents an overview of the relevant 
literature on asset sales and the implications for 
shareholders’ value, as well as the development of 
hypotheses. Section 3 describes the research method 
and the data sources. Section 4 examines the failure of 
internal capital markets and the management 
accounting system during both the Weinstock and the 
Simpson eras and presents the history of the 
diversification period from 1968 to 1996. Section 5 
discusses the methodology used to calculate and report 
the abnormal returns on the announcement dates and 
comments on groups of the most important acquisitions/ 
disposals and their impact on shareholders’ value. The 
last section sets out some conclusions. 
2 In May 2003, Marconi renamed as Marconi Corporation plc as a result of restructuring, giving 
creditors 99.5% of the shares. 
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Literature Review and Hypotheses Development 
 
Divestiture of an asset takes place when the asset holds 
back the seller’s other operations. That would be the 
case if, for instance, the seller’s main operations were 
unrelated to that asset. An immediate consequence of a 
sell-off would be an increase in focus, i.e. the seller’s 
business would operate more resourcefully. However, 
research on divestiture has generated ambiguous 
results (Brauer, 2006). A study by John and Ofek (1995) 
on asset sales, places emphasis on focus as a principal 
motive for divestitures. They support the view that the 
gains in the firm’s value after the sell-off come from the 
enhanced management of the remaining assets. They 
use numerous accounting measures of performance 
including operating margins and return on assets, to 
ascertain that after the sell-off there is an increase in the 
profits of the firm’s remaining assets. Moreover, they 
find that the enhancement in performance is positively 
related to the increase in focus. This is mainly the result 
of elimination of negative synergies between the 
divested asset with the remaining assets and increased 
efficiency due to improved allocation of management 
time and resources in a more focused firm. They regard 
focus as the dominant explanation for a divestiture.  
 
Boudreax (1975) conducted one of the first studies on 
divestiture and its impact on shareholders’ value. He 
collected data from 1965 to 1970, for 169 US corporate 
divestiture, of which 138 were voluntary and 31 
involuntary. He argued that if a company divests, then it 
gives up the cash flows associated with the divested 
assets and takes on the cash flows of the acquiring 
divisions. A positive net present value to the divesting 
firm should be related with an increase in shareholders’ 
value.  
 
A negative net present value would imply the opposite. 
He finds that voluntary divestitures are associated with 
abnormally positive price movements in the firm’s 
shares and that if the divestiture is done properly, the 
reaction of the market is similar to the reaction from an 
acquisition or merger announcement; that is an 
increment to shareholders’ wealth. Moreover, he 
supports the view that the market reaction is consistent 
with financial theory and the then existing evidence of 
price movements related to such corporate 
announcements. Jain (1985) conducted a similar study 
to investigate the effect of voluntary sell- offs on stock 
returns. She studied a sample of a thousand sell-off 
events and found strong evidence that both sellers and 
buyers receive significant abnormal positive returns. She 
also found evidence that for a period before the sell- off 
announcements, the sellers experienced significant 
negative returns and thus supports the view that the 
sellers performed poorly before the sell-off had taken 
place. 
 
Klein (1986) examined how the information revealed on 
the announcement day of a sell-off affects the return of 
the relevant share. He found that the returns on shares 
vary according to whether the transaction price is 
announced or not. He calculated both daily and 
cumulative average returns for a number of sell-offs and 
the results led him to reject the null hypothesis that on 
average a sell-off announcement has zero or negative 
effects on the ordinary shareholders’ wealth. 
Furthermore, on average, a sell-off announcement 
results in significant but small positive excess returns for 
the seller, but not for all the announcements. He found 
that for the sub-sample where the transaction price was 
not revealed, the effect of the announcement was not 
statistically different from zero. For the sub-sample 
where the price was revealed, the returns were 
significantly positive. Finally, he found a positive relation 
between the relative size of the divestiture and the share 
returns: the larger the sell-off, the larger the return. 
 
Another early study by Hite, Owers and Rogers (1987) 
supports the efficient deployment hypothesis of asset 
sales. This hypothesis states that a sell-off promotes 
efficiency by assigning assets to better uses and the 
seller attains some of the ensuing gains. Moreover, 
managers should only hold on to those assets for which 
they have a comparative advantage, but sell them as 
soon as another firm gains that advantage and can 
manage them more resourcefully. Shareholders then 
make a profit from sell-offs eventually, whether 
managers decide to re-invest the earnings or pay them 
out. 
 
Lang, Poulsen and Stulz (1995), challenged the above 
hypothesis and put forward the financing hypothesis of 
asset sales. According to their research, “management 
values size and control, so that it is reluctant to sell 
assets for efficiency reasons alone” (p. 4). Accordingly, 
the dominant reason for a sell-off is to provide funds 
when other resources of financing are too expensive. 
Equity sales are considered unattractive mainly because 
of agency costs of debt, or asymmetries of information. 
They also support the view that once a sell-off is 
completed the value of the asset increases because if it 
had turned out to be low, the sale would not have 
happened. Their empirical results are consistent with the 
financing hypothesis of asset sales, rather than with the 
efficient deployment hypothesis.  
 
They find that firms that sell assets are usually poor 
performers and/or, have high debt. Moreover, the typical 
firm sells assets primarily because of financial distress, 
rather than because of finding out that another firm 
would run the asset more efficiently. This contradicts the 
result of the efficient deployment hypothesis that the 
stock price reaction to a successful sell-off is related to 
the use of the proceeds. Instead they find that when the 
proceeds of a sell-off are used to pay debt, there is a 
positive stock price reaction; a negative or insignificant 
stock price reaction follows sell-offs for which the 
proceeds are expected to be kept within the firm.  
Comment and Jarrell (1995) considered focus from a 
different point of view. In their study, they try to see how 
the diseconomies of scope in the 1980’s led to focus 
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and if focus is consistent with an increase in 
shareholders’ value. Finally, they examine the 
relationship between stock returns and focus. According 
to their research, focus changes as a company divests 
or acquires new businesses, or it can shift over time 
depending on the growth rate of the industry. Comment 
and Jarrell found that negative economies of scope were 
present during the 1980’s, which led to an increase in 
focus, which is consistent with shareholders’ value 
maximization.  
 
Kaiser and Stouraitis (2001), conducted an extensive 
study on Thorn EMI to evaluate the effects of reversing 
diversification and the results on shareholders’ value 
after reinvesting the proceeds of asset sales. The results 
contradict the theory that shareholders’ value is 
destroyed if the proceeds from asset sales are 
reinvested for expansion purposes through acquisitions. 
Briefly, in 1985, Thorn EMI was one of the largest 
diversified UK conglomerates whose stock price had 
declined by 44% in the previous 18 months and was 
trading at a diversification discount of 68%. The change 
in management led to an eleven-fold increase in its 
market capitalization by 1996 and an outperforming 
stock price. The new management had divested all the 
non-core operations of EMI and reinvested the proceeds 
in the core music division. Kaiser and Stouraitis, find that 
contrary to the theory, managers do not destroy 
shareholders’ value when they reinvest the proceeds 
from asset sales for expansion through acquisitions.  
 
When the conglomerate lacked funds for investment in 
its music division, it was decided to raise funds through 
asset sales. The stock market met the company’s 
announcements of acquisitions in music with positive 
reaction. Kaiser and Stouraitis attributed the increase in 
Thorn EMI’s value to the fact that management chose to 
exit from declining industries, pursue a focus strategy 
and to specific restructuring and other strategy-related 
announcements made. 
 
They report abnormal returns associated with thirty-four 
major restructuring events and they found that 
divestments resulted in large positive market reactions. 
Correspondingly, most music acquisitions resulted in 
positive market reaction. Their results support the 
hypothesis that refocusing the firm and reinvesting the 
proceeds from asset sales in acquisitions that 
strengthened the music division created value for 
shareholders. Thorn EMI raised funds by sell-offs to 
focus on their core activities and experienced operating 




In this study, three hypotheses are tested in an attempt 
to understand and explain what happened to Marconi’s 
shareholder value throughout the period under study. 
They examine how it was affected after the 
announcements of the sell-offs to pursue the focus 
strategy, the announcements of the acquisitions and 
finally the announcements of the sell-offs to reduce 
leverage.  
 
In particular, the following hypotheses are tested: 
H1: Shareholders’ value increases after the 
announcement of a corporate sell-off whose proceeds 
are used to increase focus 
 
H2: Shareholders’ value deteriorates after the 
announcement of an acquisition for expansion purposes 
 
H3: Shareholders’ value increases after the 
announcement of a corporate sell-off whose proceeds 




This study concentrates on one company, Marconi, and 
uses the theory in an attempt to understand and explain 
the specific. An explanatory case study approach was 
employed here to explain the reason behind an 
observed practice (focus strategy).  
 
The aim is not to produce generalizations but to provide 
explanations for observed practices. The case study 
research method has been criticized as an immature or 
pre-science subject area, because one cannot 
generalize from a single experiment. However, to find 
whether a theory explains the observations, one needs 
to replicate the ‘experiment’ both in similar and in 
different conditions. In particular, considering the theory 
behind corporate sell-offs, Kaiser and Stouraitis (2001) 
conducted their case study on a successful company 
that managed to create and sustain shareholders’ value 
after the focus-strategy. But one cannot conclude that 
what they found is applicable for each company that 
pursues a focus-strategy, especially for these 
companies that have had a rambling restructuring period 
and are now in great financial trouble, like Marconi 
Corporation.  
 
By conducting a similar case study on Marconi, the 
findings can be compared with Kaiser and Stouraitis’ 
(2001) and evaluate whether the theory can in fact be 
applied to both successful and unsuccessful companies.  
 
Case studies are viewed as a way to use a theory to 
explain observations. If the theory provides convincing 
explanations, it is retained and used further. If not, it is 
rejected and modified. If a sufficient number of similar 
case studies can be collected, researchers would be 
able to generate a theory. However, researchers should 
be careful not to fall into “the trap of trying to select a 
representative case or set of cases” (Yin, 1984:39), in 
order to produce statistical generalizations. Marconi is 
by no means a representative case, rather a critical one 
and that is why it was chosen to test the theory. The 
objective was to determine whether the theory provides 
plausible explanations for critical cases, or whether 
alternative theories need to be generated. 
 
 31
M. Abdel-Kader & V. Metzeniot / World Journal of Business Management 
 
 
Data Collection Method 
 
Annual reports and financial statements are the major 
means of understanding and explaining the financial 
situation of a company across time and they were 
obtained from Marconi’s web site (www.marconi.com). 
Moreover, stock market data were obtained from 
DataStream to calculate the abnormal returns around 
the announcement days. The announcement dates of 
each acquisition/disposal were carefully obtained from 
Marconi’s website and major UK newspapers through 
the Lexis-Nexus Database. Additional data sources are 
referenced in the text when appropriate3. 
 
The Failure of Internal Markets before and after the 
Focus Strategy 
 
Drawing from Seal’s (2001) study, this section provides 
a brief overview of the management accounting practice 
in Marconi, before and after the focus strategy. Under 
the leadership of Lord Weinstock, GEC had a plain 
management style. It was based on a small head office 
and it operated a substantially large number of unrelated 
business units. Goold and Campbell (1987) supported 
the view that the company fitted the model of the 
financial control company that created stand alone 
companies and did not intervene directly in their 
strategies, but monitored results through financial 
targets. Each GEC business unit was responsible for its 
investment strategy and Lord Weinstock would monitor 
their performance personally.  
 
His tactics on investment policy have been 
characterized as being constraining. He would not 
encourage any form of innovative investment proposals 
and he would not provide any large bonuses or praise if 
such an instance occurred. Each business unit would 
submit a monthly report to be analysed by Weinstock, 
with basic figures like ratios and records of sales and 
cash, which was reported as negative funding. 
Satisfactory reports with excellent profitability ratios 
were common to GEC, but GEC’s risk aversion 
regarding investment would give poor growth 
performance. This is how the “cash mountain” myth 
started unfolding. Aris (1998) recorded that GEC 
reported: net cash balance of £51 million in 1972, £250 
million after four years and £1 billion in 1996. 
“Shareholders began to wonder whether they had 
invested their money in a manufacturing company or a 
bank” (Aris, 1998:168). 
 
Under the autopoietic theory projected in Seal’s paper, 
GEC’s faulty system of management accounting did not 
evolve in any way but instead harmed the decision- 
making system. The management’s task of managing 
processes was replaced by managing figures and no 
evolution could be made from that. The non-financial 
management control system failed to produce new ways 
of developing products and markets internally. It seemed 
                                                     
3 The data collected form Marconi’s web site is considered reliable as it is factual in nature and 
not prone to bias. The data was cross-checked with other sources whenever possible. 
like marketing, research and development were GEC’s 
worst nightmares.  In 1996, GPT was the first high risk 
strategic subsidiary that was constrained by the low risk 
system of the directionless conglomerate. The 
telecommunications industry was about to explode and 
GPT would become a global player. But it was trapped 
inside GEC’s constraining financial system.  
 
When Lord Simpson took over in 1996 as chief 
executive, he adopted a focus strategy of disposing of 
all unrelated businesses of GEC and concentrating on 
three core groups - defence, telecommunications and 
industrial groups. Lord Simpson put into practice a 
“more risk, more return” strategy and was committed to 
maximizing shareholders’ value by proceeding to 
acquisitions that “were intended to be integrated to fully 
exploit cross-selling and technological synergies” (Seal, 
2001:497). The disposals and the acquisitions were 
followed by a new management control style that 
encouraged horizontal communication and team working 
across the company. As a result, a new investment 
policy was adopted: one that approved different types of 
investment projects and led to higher returns by bearing 
more risks. 
 
To keep its promise to maximize shareholders’ values, 
“Marconi introduced a value management system that 
signalled a continued, even enhanced awareness of the 
company’s stock market performance” (O’Hanlon and 
Peasnell, 1998 as cited in Seal, 2001). The new 
approach encouraged the use of existing assets in 
different ways. To back this up, an employee share 
scheme was created in which the workforce was given a 
thousand shares each that could be cashed, if and only 
if, they doubled in value within five years. New ways of 
conducting business were implemented everywhere 
across Marconi; new costing methodologies, a new role 
of management accounting in the supply chain, creation 
of a performance improvement unit. There were further 
innovations at head office. Simpson founded a Business 
Excellence Centre to circulate the best practices across 
Marconi and induce corporate learning.  
 
The new practices of management accounting in the 
post 1996 period seemed to be so promising that even a 
slight chance of failure seemed impossible. According to 
Seal, the new management control model displayed 
greater differentiation in its management control sub-
systems. But the impact of some of the old “single-
system” features of management accounting was still 
intense. Seal argues that Marconi’s shareholders’ value 
metric at head office exhibited a persistent dedication to 
a single-system thinking.  
 
Organic growth based on innovation and learning could 
not keep pace with single-system thinking. In every 
attempt to impose such a system in lower/local areas of 
the company, organic growth would be damaged and 
the company would lose the ability to generate 
‘intellectual capital’ through alliances between 
employees and customers. Furthermore, the 
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shareholders’ value approach adopted in Marconi’s 
head office contradicted the subtler ‘community of 
practice’ model advocated in the Business Excellence 
Centre. Improvement and learning could be done 
without the shareholder value metric to measure it.  
 
To sum up, GEC as a diversified conglomerate was 
trading at a diversification discount primarily because of 
its luck in organic growth. It was more concerned with 
making a ‘cash mountain’ than delivering shareholder 
value. On the other hand, GEC/Marconi as a focused 
company, even after adopting a more efficient 
management accounting system still had a number of 
unsettled issues, the most important being the tension 
between the single-system shareholder value metric and 
the more relaxed approach introduced at corporate and 
divisional levels. 
 
The Diversification Period 
 
The origin of Marconi can be traced back to 1897 when 
Guglielmo Marconi founded “The Wireless Telegraph 
and Signal Company”, later to be known as Marconi plc. 
In 1946, the English Electric Company (EEC) took over 
Marconi’s Wireless Telegraph Company and in 1968 the 
English Electric Company merged with the General 
Electric Company (GEC). From 1897 to 1999 when GEC 
became Marconi Plc, the latter changed name several 
times: 
 
1897 Marconi’s Wireless Telegraph Company 
1963 Marconi Company Limited 
1987 GEC Marconi Limited 
1998 Marconi Electronic Systems Limited  
1999 Marconi Plc 
 
Just after the World War II, business did not look good 
for the English Electric company. The war was over and 
the manufacturing of aircrafts was not optimal anymore. 
George Nelson, the managing director of EEC decided 
to move away from aircraft and proceeded to buy 
Marconi. By the end of the 1950’s the EEC still had 
persistent long-term problems. In an attempt to resolve 
them, Nelson proposed a merger with GEC, which was 
at first rejected but eventually, took place, in under 
GEC’s managing director Arnold Weinstock in 1968. 
This merger left EEC and GEC, (who had earlier taken 
over the Radio and Alied Industries (RAI) and had 
acquired the Associated Electrical Industries (AEI), with 
half of the rising turbo generator business. Arnold 
Weinstock continued with a series of acquisitions, most 
of which are discussed here in detail, except the Yarrow 
Shipbuilders acquisition in 1974 and the Avery 
acquisition in 1979, for which the authors were unable to 
retrieve any information. 
 
March 1988 witnessed the creation of GEC Plessey 
telecommunications (GPT). GEC decided to merge its 
communications interests with Plessey and create GPT 
with a turnover of almost £1.2 billion and an asset base 
of £428 million. Plessey was paid £45 million by GEC 
because it was putting in more than GEC. The son of 
Lord Weinstock was the only main board member. The 
joint venture of GEC-Plessey was then seen as the 
chance for the British telecommunications industry to 
become a world player, since GPT was to become one 
of the top ten world companies in its sector. The 
following year GEC and Siemens, the West German 
group acquired Plessey. It was the second time Lord 
Weinstock had bid for Plessey4 in an attempt to 
strengthen and rationalize the British electronics 
industry. GEC continued its policy of developing its 
businesses, by forming a power generation and 
transport arm GEC Alsthom, with Compagnie General 
D’Electricite. GEC Alsthom was a European group with 
powerful positions in France, the UK and several export 
markets. This deal too faced some difficulties at the 
Monopolies Commission. The new company would have 
annual sales of £4 billion and 85.000 employees; it was 
the largest power engineering company in the European 
Community with net assets of £800 million. Siemens 
took a 40 per cent interest in GPT while GEC acquired a 
50 per cent stake in Siemens’ electronics business. Lord 
Weinstock’s plan was to create a web of joint ventures 
involving different partners to make it harder for any 
hostile predator to attack GEC. 
 
On January 14th 1990, Ferranti decided to agree to Lord 
Weinstock’s offer of £310 million to buy its defence 
system. The £310 million sale price included part of 
Ferranti’s interest in Italy and all the business and 
assets of the Edinburgh-based defence operation. 
Thomson CFS, the French defence group had 
previously offered £200 million to buy Ferranti - £200 
million being the estimated value of Ferranti’s sales 
purely on defence electronics. The deal had high 
importance at the time since it represented a dramatic 
stage in the restructuring of the UK defence electronics 
sector. It left the UK defence market with two dominant 
players: GEC and British Aerospace. From the Ferranti 
deal GEC got a big head start in radar and navigation 
systems and lifted its defence turnover to £2.7 billion. 
Even before the £310 million acquisition of Ferranti, 
GEC was fourth in the world league of defence 
electronics companies. 
 
Following the Yarrow Shipbuilders acquisition in 1985 
and the Ferranti acquisition in 1990 and in an attempt to 
build a comprehensive naval system, Lord Weinstock 
out-bid British Aerospace with a share cash offer worth 
£532 million for submarine builder Vickers Shipbuilding 
and Engineering Ltd (VSEL). A price war between BA 
and GEC began and GEC came up with a second offer 
of £835 million against the new £660 million offer made 
by BA. The fight ended with Lord Weinstock emerging 
as winner and therefore being the decisive player in the 
future British defence industry. GEC had ample cash 
resources to fund its offer. At the end of September 
1995 net cash balances were £1.43 billion. However, 
Lord Weinstock’s £835 million offer did not seem to 
4 The first one was in 1985 when Weinstock’s proposal was turned down by the Monopolies 
Commission. 
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make much sense. He was paying 20 times the earnings 
for a business whose profits could fall off in three years 
time. On the other hand, GEC’s successful bid made BA 
smaller and financially weaker and therefore an easier 
potential prey for GEC later. 
 
GEC’s bid on VSEL was greeted with a great deal of 
scepticism by the Ministry of Defence (MoD). At the 
beginning of the BA-GEC battle, analysts thought that 
because of potential monopoly problems GEC would not 
even think about bidding.  GEC bid for VSEL because it 
would then own the two large warship yards left in the 
UK. The Royal Navy was not happy with one company 
owning both yards. However, even if GEC gained 
monopoly power from the acquisition, the MoD gained 
power by being the only UK buyer of warships. The MoD 
did allow GEC to bid at the end and the long battle 
between BA and GEC that began in October 1994, 
ended in December 1995 emerging as GEC being the 
winner.   
 
In 1996, Lord Weinstock retired after 33 years of leading 
GEC. So what was GEC under the Lord Weinstock’s 
leadership? According to an interview with John Mayo, 
the chief executive of GEC until July 20015, GEC was 
an old-style conglomerate, a group of unrelated 
businesses that relied on government cost-plus 
contracts. It had many activities locked in joint ventures 
and had not even started adjusting to the new 
commercial and competitive markets of the 1990’s, in 
which cost-plus contracts were no longer optimal. GEC 
was a conglomerate with joint ventures: a 50:50 joint 
venture in power generation, a 60:40 joint venture in 
communications, GPT and finally, a smaller 
communications company in Italy, Marconi SpA. 
Investors viewed GEC as a business that had 
increasingly failed to deliver shareholder value.  
 
Similar companies on the other hand had produced 
better performances, a fact leading to the view that there 
was time and a need for change. Since 1982, GEC had 
been constantly under performing on the FTSE All 
Share index and thus shareholders wanted the 
unwinding of the joint ventures, to achieve focus and the 
ability to strategically distribute their resources according 
to sectors. Finally shareholders wanted GEC to invest 
the cash mountain of £1billion it held. 
 
On September 6th 1996, at the Annual General Meeting, 
George Simpson took over from Lord Weinstock as 
managing director of GEC and started a new era of 
corporate management. 
 
Abnormal Returns for Restructuring 
Announcements by GEC/ Marconi Plc 
 
Dates and relevant announcements as published in 
various UK newspapers and the Marconi web site are 
reported in the Appendix. Details of each 
announcement: whether it is an acquisition or a 
5 Financial Times, January 18, 2002, p18. 
disposal, the relevant parties and the acquisition or 
disposal prices are also reported. It should be noted that 
prices of some acquisitions/disposals are not reported in 
Sterling pounds due to the lack of the exchange rates 
used in the transaction6. The abnormal return for each 
acquisition and disposal is calculated and reported in the 
Appendix. 
 
This research uses the event study methodology to 
assess the impact of the company’s new focus strategy 
(acquisitions/ disposals) on the value of the firm7. To 
calculate the actual returns of a company i at day t the 










where Pit is the share price of the company i on day t 
and Pt-1 is the share price on day t-1.  
To calculate the company’s return over a multiperiod 
event window the actual returns were compounded: 
 
 )1(*...*)1(*)1(  )(1 11 +−− +++≡+ Nitititit RRRNR
. 
The multi-period simple net returns are: Rit(N)-1. This 
study reports the buy and hold abnormal returns BHAR[-
1,1], BHAR[-1,2], BHAR[-1,3], BHAR[-1,4] and BHAR[-
1,5] for trading days [-1,1], [-1,2], [-1,3], [-1,4] and [-1,5] 
relative to the announcement day t=0 (defined as the 
day the relevant news appear in the UK newspapers 
reported earlier and the Marconi web site) and –1 being 
the day before the announcement, +1 the day after the 
announcement and +2 the second day after the 
announcement and so on. The wealth effect of the 
announcement is captured by the change in the share 
price beyond the normal or expected changes. 
 
The ARit is defined as the difference between the actual 
Rit return and the expected E(Rit):  
ARit = Rit – E(Rit). 
 
To obtain the expected returns the market adjusted 
model E(Rit) = Rmt was used. The London Stock market 
FTSE 100 index was used for the benchmark. The buy 
and hold abnormal returns for the [-1,+1], [-1,+2], [-1,+3], 
[-1,+4] and [-1,+5] days are calculated as follows: 
 
BHAR[-1,+1] = (1+AR-1)(1+ AR0)(1+ AR+1)-1  
BHAR[-1,+2] = (1+AR-1)(1+ AR0)(1+ AR+1)(1+ AR+2) –1 
BHAR[-1,+3] = (1+AR-1)(1+ AR0)(1+   
  AR+1)(1+AR+2)(1+AR+3) –1 
BHAR[-1,+4] = (1+AR-1)(1+ AR0)(1+ AR+1)(1+  
  AR+2)(1+AR+3)(1+AR+4)–1 
BHAR[-1,+5] = (1+AR-1)(1+ AR0)(1+ AR+1)(1+  
  AR+2)(1+AR+3)(1+AR+4)(1+AR+5)–1 
 
Finally, the test of significance was conducted for seven 
days window (-1, 0, +1, +2,+3, +4, +5) and their t-
                                                     
6 There are four different currencies were used: Sterling pounds (£), US dollars ($), Australian 
dollars (A$) and Euros (€). 
7 See, for example, Alexander et al. (1984), Hite and Owers (1983), Jain (1985) and Mulherin 
& Boone (2000). 
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statistics are 0.57, 0.86, 0.26, -0.49, 0.72, -0.20, -0.27 
for each day respectively. These results are not all 
statistically significant. Moreover, what is encouraging is 
that the t-statistics around day zero are larger than the t-
statistics around any other day. This can be attributed, 
among other explanations, to the fact that when the 
positive and negative abnormal returns were 
aggregated, they offset each other and therefore the 
true effect can only be captured when the events are 
classified. 
 
The History of the Restructuring of GEC/Marconi 
and its Effects on Shareholders’ value 
 
Following Lord Weinstock’s departure in 1996, George 
Simpson was appointed as chief executive of GEC. In 
December 1996, he started his new plan to restructure 
the business assembled by his predecessor. After 
announcing the half-year results, he outlined the group’s 
disposal plans. He intended to sell large parts of its 
industrial businesses that did not belong to GEC, which 
were made up of more than 150 separate companies. 
Simpson drew up a strategic plan to be completed by 
July 1997 and expected to raise £300 million from the 
sales. 1997 was an important year in shaping the future 
direction of GEC. Apart from Simpson’s plan to dispense 
all activities not seen as central to GEC’s future, his 
biggest concerned focused on GEC-Marconi, (the 
defence business), since he considered it to be at the 
heart of the future of GEC.  
 
In the analysis to follow, there are some comments on 
groups of acquisitions/ disposals according to whether 
they stand out of the sample due to peculiarities. At the 
end of the group’s discussion, an overall critic of the 
results is given to explain whether they are consistent 
with the theory. 
 
Analysis of disposals for focus strategy 
 
In December 1996, Simpson outlined the group’s 
disposal plans (see Table 1). The first disposal of an 
unwanted business was that of Satchwell Controls, the 
UK’s largest manufacturer of systems to manage 
temperature, airflow and humidity in commercial 
buildings. Satchwell Controls was sold to Siebe, a 
diversified engineering group for £80m including debt. 
Satchwell had been part of GEC since 1968. In the year 
before the sale it delivered record profits, making £4.9m 
from sales of £60.3m. It had net assets of £9.4m and 
employed around 1,000 people. Despite Satchwell’s 
success, Simpson was more concerned with focus and 
Satchwell had to go. 
 
 
Table 1: Returns on Disposals for Focus Strategy 
  MARCONI FTSE 100 – PRICE INDEX  
AnDate  £ RM £ RFT AR   
Satchwell      
-1 1/1/1997 308.24 0 4118.5 0 0   
0 2/1/1997 304.61 -0.01178 4057.4 -0.01484 0.003059   
1 3/1/1997 309.86 0.017235 4089.5 0.007911 0.009324 BHAR[-1,1] 1.24% 
2 6/1/1997 316.31 0.020816 4106.5 0.004157 0.016659 BHAR[-1,2] 2.93% 
3 7/1/1997 316.72 0.001296 4078.8 -0.00675 0.008042 BHAR[-1,3] 3.76% 
4 8/1/1997 320.35 0.011461 4087.5 0.002133 0.009328 BHAR[-1,4] 4.72% 
5 9/1/1997 323.98 0.011331 4087 -0.00012 0.011454 BHAR[-1,5] 5.92% 
AB Dick      
-1 3/1/1997 309.86 0.017235 4089.5 0.007911 0.009324   
0 6/1/1997 316.31 0.020816 4106.5 0.004157 0.016659   
1 7/1/1997 316.72 0.001296 4078.8 -0.00675 0.008042 BHAR[-1,1] 3.44% 
2 8/1/1997 320.35 0.011461 4087.5 0.002133 0.009328 BHAR[-1,2] 4.40% 
3 9/1/1997 323.98 0.011331 4087 -0.00012 0.011454 BHAR[-1,3] 5.60% 
4 10/1/1997 320.75 -0.00997 4056.6 -0.00744 -0.00253 BHAR[-1,4] 5.33% 
5 13/1/1997 325.59 0.01509 4107.3 0.012498 0.002591 BHAR[-1,5] 5.61% 
Wire and Cables Group      
-1 18/3/1997 311.47 -0.0128 4356.8 -0.00377 -0.00903   
0 19/3/1997 310.67 -0.00257 4332.2 -0.00565 0.003078   
1 20/3/1997 303.4 -0.0234 4258.1 -0.0171 -0.0063 BHAR[-1,1] -1.22% 
2 21/3/1997 303.81 0.001351 4254.8 -0.00077 0.002126 BHAR[-1,2] -1.01% 
3 24/3/1997 299.37 -0.01461 4214.8 -0.0094 -0.00521 BHAR[-1,3] -1.53% 
4 25/3/1997 297.75 -0.00541 4270.7 0.013263 -0.01867 BHAR[-1,4] -3.37% 
5 26/3/1997 301.39 0.012225 4301.5 0.007212 0.005013 BHAR[-1,5] -2.88% 
Marconi Instruments      
-1 5/2/1998 316.31 0.00512 5606.4 0.001894 0.003222   
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0 6/2/1998 318.73 0.00765 5629.7 0.004156 0.003495   
1 9/2/1998 313.89 -0.01519 5600.9 -0.00512 -0.01007 BHAR[-1,1] -0.34% 
2 10/2/1998 313.49 -0.00127 5613.3 0.002214 -0.00349 BHAR[-1,2] -0.69% 
3 11/2/1998 311.47 -0.00644 5607.9 -0.00096 -0.00548 BHAR[-1,3] -1.23% 
4 12/2/1998 307.44 -0.01294 5552.5 -0.00988 -0.00306 BHAR[-1,4] -1.54% 
5 13/2/1998 309.86 0.00787 5582.3 0.005367 0.002505 BHAR[-1,5] -1.29% 
GEC Plessey Semiconductors      
-1 11/2/1998 311.47 -0.00644 5607.9 -0.00096 -0.00548   
0 12/2/1998 307.44 -0.01294 5552.5 -0.00988 -0.00306   
1 13/2/1998 309.86 0.00787 5582.3 0.00537 0.002505 BHAR[-1,1] -0.60% 
2 16/2/1998 309.05 -0.00261 5619.9 0.00674 -0.00935 BHAR[-1,2] -1.53% 
3 17/2/1998 309.05 0 5709.5 0.01594 -0.01594 BHAR[-1,3] -3.10% 
4 18/2/1998 303.4 -0.01828 5723.4 0.00243 -0.02072 BHAR[-1,4] -5.11% 
5 19/2/1998 300.98 -0.00798 5718.5 -0.00086 -0.00712 BHAR[-1,5] -5.79% 
 
The second disposal took place a few days later. GEC 
sold AB Dick, its Chicago-based office equipment 
company to Paragon Corporate Holdings Inc. The sale 
price was not revealed. AB Dick together with Videojet, 
a printer manufacturing business, made operating profits 
of £37 million with a £299 million turnover. Its 
performance however, was not satisfactory according to 
GEC’s standards and off it went. 
 
The next disposal was that of the Wire and Cables 
Group on 19th March. The business was sold to TT 
Group Plc for £16 million in cash. The Wire and Cables 
Group had a turnover of £197 million, profits of £2 
million and net assets of £34 million. 
 
The last two disposals of this group were the disposals 
of Marconi Instruments to IFR Systems Inc for £65 
million and a few days later the disposal of GEC Plessey 
Semiconductors to Mitel Corporation for £135 million. 
Marconi Instruments included business units in Britain, 
France, Spain, Germany and the United States. It had 
£4.5 million profits on sales of £65.9 million. GEC 
Plessey Semiconductors had sales of £215 million and 
profits of £7.2 million. All the above disposals left GEC 
with almost £1 billion in hand, to pursue its focus policy. 
 
According to the theory, one would expect the share 
price of Marconi to rise, which in turn would give positive 
abnormal returns. In most of the above disposals not 
only are low abnormal returns reported, but also, in the 
case of GEC Plessey Semiconductors, the abnormal 
return is negative. Apart from the AB Dick return, no 
other return is even close to being significant, a fact that 
is contradicts the theory. On the announcement day, 
investors are very cautious and in some cases they 
even have a negative reaction. In many cases, the 
returns on Marconi are negative; not just for the disposal 
day but for the next two days also. One might argue that 
these five disposals were part of GEC’s new managing 
director’s strategy and since investors were not familiar 
with his methods they did not support his plan. On the 
other hand, the abnormal returns on the Satchwell 
disposal were found, surprisingly, to be lower than the 
abnormal returns of other disposals. Actually, the 
expectation was to report quite high abnormal returns for 
the first disposals, since they represented the new focus 
strategy, which at the end of the day, was what 
shareholders wanted. In all of the above disposals the 
abnormal returns seem to follow at an increasing scale. 
It is worthwhile noting that as days pass investors seem 
to react more to the news and the market also reacts in 
a more upbeat manner. This results in largely significant 
BHARs for the fifth, sixth and seventh day’s windows. 
This fact is consistent with the theory that the 
announcements of corporate sell-offs result in large 
positive stock market reaction. However, it is to be noted 
that in the Satchwell disposal the BHAR[-1,4] and the 
BHAR[-1,5] are significantly high and this could be 
effected by the AB Dick disposal, which took place in the 
fifth day of the window. 
 
Analysis of acquisitions for focus strategy 
 
March and April of 1999 witnessed two very important 
acquisitions taking place with ambiguous consequences 
for shareholder value. In the middle of these two 
acquisitions, Marconi also acquired Logitron and Tetrel 
Ltd on the 3rd March, for which positive significant 
abnormal returns are reported. In this section the Reltec 
and Fore acquisitions and their impact on shareholder 
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Table 2:  Returns on Acquisition for Expansion 
  MARCONI  FTSE 100 - PRICE INDEX   
AnDate  £ RM  £ RFT  AR   
Reltec         
-1 26/2/1999 404.69 -0.02449  6175.1 -0.00506  -0.01943   
0 1/3/1999 419.32 0.036151  6060.9 -0.01849  0.054645   
1 2/3/1999 435.57 0.038753  6061.3 6.60E-05  0.038687 BHAR[-1,1] 7.42% 
2 3/3/1999 459.14 0.054113  6048.3 -0.00214  0.056258 BHAR[-1,2] 13.46% 
3 4/3/1999 464.01 0.010607  6101.4 0.00878  0.001827 BHAR[-1,3] 13.67% 
4 5/3/1999 455.07 -0.01927  6205.5 0.01706  -0.03633 BHAR[-1,4] 9.54% 
5 8/3/1999 453.86 -0.00266  6208.9 0.00055  -0.00321 BHAR[-1,5] 9.19% 
Fore         
-1 23/4/1999 470.51 0.02025  6427.99 0.00225  0.018   
0 26/4/1999 494.49 0.05097  6503.59 0.01176  0.0392   
1 27/4/1999 536.34 0.08463  6593.62 0.01384  0.07079 BHAR[-1,1] 13.28% 
2 28/4/1999 526.99 -0.01743  6598.77 0.00078  -0.01821 BHAR[-1,2] 11.22% 
3 29/4/1999 530.65 0.00695  6497.6 -0.01533  0.02228 BHAR[-1,3] 13.69% 
4 30/4/1999 535.12 0.00842  6552.18 0.0084  2.36E-05 BHAR[-1,4] 13.70% 
5 3/5/1999 535.12 0  6552.18 0  0 BHAR[-1,5] 13.70% 
 
On the 1st March 1999, Marconi acquired the US 
telecommunication network products company, Reltec 
for £1.3 billion ($2.1 billion). Reltec based, in Ohio, was 
at the time a fast expanding operation with sales of more 
than $1 billion annually. In the year ended 31st 
December 1999, Reltec reported revenues of $1,067 
million and net income of $30 million. The sale price of 
$2.1 billion included net debt of $361 million and was 
equivalent to an agreed price of $29.50 per share in 
cash that represented a premium of 36% on the closing 
price on Friday 26th February. Reltec became part of the 
Marconi Communications’ group and would sell 
Marconi’s products to the US market, with its own 
products being incorporated in Marconi’s portfolio. It 
represented an attractive acquisition because firstly, it 
gave Marconi access to the US market and secondly, 
the synergies between Reltec and Marconi in terms of 
products created a new product portfolio that would 
increase the size of the markets addressable by 
Marconi.  
 
Thirdly, Reltec would strengthen Marconi’s existing 
portfolio of products, making Marconi more attractive to 
its existing customers. Size and geographic reach were 
becoming increasingly important in the industry at the 
time, therefore the Reltec acquisition would help 
Marconi to create a global enterprise with competitive 
advantages and significant value to shareholders. The 
acquisition was expected to enhance earnings per share 
before goodwill and group cash flow return on 
investment. 
 
On 26 April 1999, Marconi announced the acquisition of 
Fore Systems Inc, which was based in Pennsylvania 
and was a leading designer and producer of high 
performance networking products based on ATM and IP 
technologies. The acquisition price was £2.8 billion or 
$35 per share in cash, which represented a premium of 
43% on the Fore closing share price on Friday 23rd of 
April. Fore’s revenues were $632 million with gross profit 
of £346 million and at that time it was a leading global 
supplier of high performance, internet switching 
equipment. Along with Marconi Communications’ 
leading optical network solutions and next generation 
access products (acquired with Reltec), Marconi was 
positioned at the front of the rapidly growing global 
communication infrastructure market. Fore was an 
attractive acquisition at the time because it would 
strengthen Marconi’s presence in the USA, which was 
the world’s largest market for telecommunications 
equipment. That would provide Marconi with access to 
new markets and new customers, extend Marconi’s 
market portfolio and give a big boost to their sales. It 
was expected that the acquisition would be neutral to 
Marconi’s earnings per share before goodwill in the year 
to follow, but would enhance earnings thereafter. 
 
At the time, the market welcomed both US acquisitions. 
They were seen as a wise move by GEC because they 
would increase its market value and the synergies 
between GEC and the acquired companies were 
excellent in terms of the existing industry, the potential 
of the industry and management expertise. Reltec’s 
management team and employees would bring depth of 
experience in sales, marketing and operations. A 
significant 5.46% abnormal return is reported for the 
Reltec acquisition with high BHAR for all time windows 
of 7.42%, 13.46%, 13.67%, 9.54% and 9.19% 
respectively.  
 
Let us point out though that the return on the FTSE 100 
on the announcement date of the acquisition was –
1.8%. Overall, the Fore acquisition was thought to be a 
“bargain”. Marconi paid a huge amount of money, to 
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achieve a huge amount of money. The announcement of 
the acquisition was taken very warmly by investors, 
increasing shareholders’ value. The abnormal return on 
the day of the announcement was quite significant 
(3.92%) and the BHAR for all time windows were 
increasingly and positively significant. Accordingly, the 
return on the FTSE 100 on that date was 1.17%. 
However, the market might have welcomed these two 
acquisitions too warmly. Firstly, ATM (connection 
oriented technology), which was Fore’s specialty was 
not too fashionable at the time, so the extreme abnormal 
return reported the day of the acquisition is not validly 
justifiable. Secondly, the prices paid for these two 
companies were thought to be too high. In the case of 
Reltec there was a 36% premium on the closing share 
price; plus the sale price incorporated net debt of $361 
million.  
 
The price paid for Fore was also seen as high: a 
premium of 43% on the closing share price. These two 
large cash purchases enhanced shareholders’ value at 
that time, but one cannot help wonder what their impact 
was in the longer term. The answer could be, almost 
with certainty, that they contributed to Marconi’s 
transition to an over-debted and value-destroying 
company. To be more precise, to pay for these 
acquisitions, Marconi could only use cash because it 
was not compliant with the US Foreign Corrupt Practices 
Act and could not list shares in the US for use as 
acquisition currency. Thus Marconi had to borrow £2.1 
billion to finance these acquisitions. That however was 
not manageable debt and there is no doubt that 
Marconi’s management made over-optimistic 
assumptions in 1999 about the potential for growth in 
Reltec and Fore. In the longer term, the consequence of 
these two acquisitions was value destruction.   
 
 According to theory, the announcements of these 
acquisitions should be related to negatively significant 
abnormal returns, which is not the case here. Positive 
abnormal returns are reported, which mean an increase 
in shareholders’ value. However, the authors conjecture 
that even though the immediate effect of the 
announcements was positive, shareholders’ wealth 
deteriorated eventually because of the debt problems 
associated with the acquisitions on later dates. This 
conjecture is based on the assessment of the data, 
financial reports and above all, on facts. At the very end 
of 1999, Marconi’s share price was outperforming the 
FTSE 100. The company had made rapid progress as 
communications equipment and IT provider. Lord 
Simpson had succeeded in pursuing his focus strategy 
and in mid 2000 when the company reported its full-year 
profits, the figures more than fulfilled analysts’ 
expectations.  
 
Sales in core business had risen by 40 per cent and 
operating profits had gone up by 48 per cent. After all 
the successful acquisitions, Marconi needed to win 
some big orders to keep its place at the top. In 
September 2000 Marconi’s share reached its peak at 
£12.50. However, in 2001, after BT and other telecom 
service providers cut back on their capital spending on 
equipment, Marconi’s order book plunged; so did the 
telecommunications’ sector; so did the FTSE- 100; so 
did Marconi’s share price. Table 3 shows turnover, 
operating performance and earnings per share for the 
years from 1996 to 2002. The deterioration in turnover 
began in 2001 and was very obvious by 2002. 
 
Table 3: Operating Performance for GEC (1996-1999) 
and Marconi (1999-2002) 
Year 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 
Turnover  
 3,440 3,515 3,768 4,090 5,724 5,181 3,479 
   (394) (-) (-) (1,761) 
(1,088
) 
Operating Performance: (loss)/profit 
 378 369 439 508 750 754 {463} 
Earnings {Loss} per share 



















Table 3 shows turnover, operating performance and 
earnings per share for GEC/Marconi. Turnover figures 
are given for continuing and discontinued operations (in 
parenthesis). Operating performance figures are for 
continuing operations, excluding goodwill amortization 
and exceptional items. Earnings per share are given for 
continuing operations excluding goodwill amortization 
and exceptional items. Basic earnings per share are 
given in parenthesis. Data were obtained from annual 
reports. All figures are in £ millions unless stated 
differently.  
 
Figure 1 shows standardized values for Marconi’s stock 
price, the Telecommunication’s Index and the FTSE 100 
index during 1996-2002. Marconi’s share price was 
heading for a tumble.     Analysts at that time said that 
Marconi was rather unlucky because of the state of the 
market. Furthermore, the company had severe debt 
problems. At the year ending 31st March 2001, Marconi’s 
net debt amounted to £3,167 million. After a number of 
profit warnings during the same year, Lord Simpson 
ceased being part of Marconi’s management team. The 
company then pursued a new strategy of further 
disposals, but not for the purpose of focusing; rather to 
reduce its debt. In October of 2001, Marconi announced 
its first disposal to reduce net debt. After four major 
disposals (Medical Systems, Commerce Systems, Data 
Systems and the 50 per cent stake in GDA), as well as a 
number of non-core asset disposals, Marconi managed 
to raise £1,559 million and reduce its net debt to £2,865 
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Figure 1: Stock price of Marconi, Telecommunica-
tions Index and FTSE 100 Index (1996-2002) 
Price movements of Marconi's share relative 











1996 199 199 199 200 200 2002
 
 
The figure shows standardized values for Marconi’s 
stock price, the telecommunications index and the FTSE 
100 Index for the London Stock Exchange during 1996-
2002. All series are standardized so that their value on 
01-01-1996 equals 100 (see table 4, annexure A). 
 
This group of disposals gave results that support the 
“financing hypothesis of asset sales” discussed earlier, 
according to which the stock price reaction of a 
successful sell-off is positive if the proceeds are used to 
pay back debt. Out of a total of eight disposals to reduce 
net debt, one produced a quite significant abnormal 
return of 1.79 percent and the rest enhanced 
shareholders’ value by very significant percentages. On 
average, the new disposals’ strategy to reduce net debt 
enhanced shareholders’ value. Two disposals’ 
announcements had a negative impact on shareholders’ 
value, but that is attributed not to the nature of the 
disposal but to negative news appearing in newspapers 
about Marconi’s debt.  
 
In particular, the –4.4% abnormal return on the Marconi 
Medical Systems disposal was a product of Marconi’s 
announcement about renegotiating its banks’ contracts. 
Marconi intended to request a longer term for its loans 
and offer banks higher interest rates. The debt would be 
moved from the company to the subsidiaries which 
would give banks greater access to cash flow.  Marconi 
was portrayed as a company without a future and that 
affected its share price around those days. The same 
situation resulted in the Lottomatica and the Data 
Systems disposals, for which a negative abnormal return 
of –3.45% is reported.  
 
Around those days, Marconi’s image in the corporate 
world was rather vague; it was represented as a 
company debilitated by corporate debacles and debt. 
Overall, it must be pointed out, that, unlike in the case of 
sell-offs to pursue a focus strategy, in this case the 
BHAR for all the day windows does not follow an 
increasing scale. As days pass, when the abnormal 
return is negative it becomes more negative; when it is 
positive, it becomes less so. Additionally, it should be 
noted that the BHAR around the days of the first 
Lottomatica disposal (28 Nov 2001), the second 
Lottomatica disposal and the Data Systems disposal (5 
Feb 2002) may be enlarged because of further disposals 




This case study examined GEC/Marconi’s conversion 
from a diversified conglomerate to a focused 
telecommunications and information technology 
company. The diversification period between 1968-1996 
and the restructuring period from 1996-2002 were 
examined. The restructuring of GEC/Marconi was a 
gradual one. Therefore, this case gave the opportunity 
to quantify some of the benefits/costs of the gradual 
restructuring and to test the following hypotheses:  
 
H1: Shareholders’ value increases after the 
announcement of a corporate sell-off whose proceeds 
are used to increase focus 
H2:  Shareholders’ value deteriorates after the 
announcement of an acquisition for expansion purposes 
 
H3:  Shareholders’ value increases after the 
announcement of a corporate sell-off whose proceeds 
are used to decrease leverage. 
 
The abnormal returns on the announcement days and 
the buy and hold abnormal returns around the 
announcement days (7 day window) for forty-four 
acquisition/disposal announcements were calculated.  
Information about the sale price and the sellers/buyers 
of the disposed/acquired businesses was also gathered 
in an attempt to assess the validity of GEC/Marconi’s 
actions. 
 
Evidence was found to support the theory that corporate 
sell-offs are connected with positive stock price reaction. 
However, it is reported that some disposal 
announcements were related with significantly high 
negative abnormal returns. The results are consistent 
with Boudreax (1975), Jain (1985) and Klein’s (1986) 
findings. 
 
Similar results were obtained for the disposals whose 
proceeds were used to reduce leverage. Most of the 
abnormal returns reported were excessively positive, as 
supported by Lang et al. (1995), with only two cases of 
highly negative abnormal returns.  
 
Finally, the stock market’s reaction to the 
announcements of acquisitions (to pursue the focus 
strategy) was examined. On average it was found that 
shareholders’ value increased. This finding is consistent 
with Comment and Jarrell’s (1995) findings. However, 
shareholders’ value strongly deteriorated from 1996 
when Lord Simpson took over and imposed the focus 
strategy. Therefore, the authors conjecture that in this 
particular case, shareholders’ value was destroyed by 
the focus strategy, but this result was not observable in 
the abnormal returns calculated on the announcement 
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dates. The test of significance conducted for the seven-
day window supports this conjecture. 
 
Overall, the restructuring of GEC/Marconi, provides an 
example that counters the theory that managers destroy 
shareholders’ value when they reinvest the proceeds 
from asset sales for expansion through acquisitions. 
However, evidence supporting the theory was found in a 
few cases: the analysis of GEC/Marconi reveals 
similarities and differences compared with the 
restructuring of Thorn EMI (Kaiser and Stouraitis, 2001). 
The Thorn EMI case contradicts the idea that managers 
destroy shareholders’ value when they reinvest the 
proceeds from asset sales for expansion through 
acquisitions. The only difference between the current 
case study and the Thorn case study, is that, even 
though the market met Marconi’s announcements of 
acquisitions/disposals with a positive reaction, Marconi’s 
shareholders’ value deteriorated during the restructuring 
period and never managed to recover. 
 
At the end of 1996, GEC’s infamous cash mountain had 
to be invested. Shareholders were demanding focus to 
achieve value for their money. The obvious path for the 
diversified conglomerate was to pursue a focus strategy.  
Its decision to concentrate on the telecommunications 
and information technology sector was welcomed by 
everyone. Lord Simpson planned his new strategy 
efficiently, but the results were not easy to predict. The 
telecommunications sector downturn had its effect on 
the results as well. The restructuring was accompanied 
by heavy debt and an extraordinary decrease in 
shareholders’ value.  
 
Finally, this case study raises a number of questions 
that could be addressed in future research on corporate 
restructuring. In particular, could it be the case that there 
is no unique answer as to whether a focus strategy 
through corporate sell-offs, is value enhancing on an 
individual basis? Under what conditions do corporate 
sell-offs and the reinvestment of the proceeds for 
acquisitions become value enhancing? What obstacles 
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